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Welfare to work : integrating the British labour market
Welfare to Work was one of the Labour Party’s flagship policies during the run-up to the
1997 elections.  Despite  the  fact  that  official  unemployment  figures  were  very  rosy,  it  is
indeed  unthinkable  for  a  political  party  not  to  treat  job  creation  as  one  of  its  main
preoccupations given the predicament in which the labour market has been ever since mass
unemployment became structural. Governments of all persuasions have had to come to terms
with the fact that unless they “think the unthinkable” a return to full employment is a figment
of their imagination.1
The Labour Party that was elected in 1997 after a historic landslide victory, was keen on
being acknowledged not only as a viable alternative to conservative politics,  but also as a
political organisation which had ceased to feed upon ideologies that were no longer popular
with  the  electorate.  With  Tony  Blair  as  their  young  charismatic  leader,  an  outspoken
“moderniser”, the Labour Party was to shed its old skin and emerge as the “new” Labour
party thus breaking with the party’s historic trajectory. It therefore had to come up with a few
high profile ideas that would pay tribute to this title and the “New Deal” was – and still is –
one of them.  According to  New Labour,  Welfare  to  Work has been so successful  that  it
deserves to be extended to all  the unemployed thus becoming the “permanent  deal” [The
Times, Labour Party Conference September 27 & 28, 1999].
It would be churlish even so, to suggest that the Welfare to Work project was quite simply
an electoral ploy. To assume this would be to brush aside not only the vast sums of money
invested in the scheme, but also the mirror image that Welfare to Work gives of what New
Labour is – or at least is trying to be – all about. On closer scrutiny, the government’s plans to
get the young unemployed back to work encompass all that New Labour tries to portray as
being original, thus allowing it to reinforce its image of being the party of innovative politics
1 This is precisely what Tony Blair asked his political “think tanks” to do: “think the unthinkable”.
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and policies. Welfare to Work is a cocktail of “third way” jargon: the stakeholder society, the
inclusive  society,  employability,  communitarianism,  rights  and  responsibilities  and  other
catch phrases that even though they may at first irritate, do give the impression that something
is up. The Labour Party has perhaps finally understood that after eighteen years sitting on the
benches reserved for Her Majesty’s Opposition, the time has come for major change.
This  paper  will  therefore  look  into  Welfare  to  Work  used  not  only  as  a  deliberate
mechanism to reduce unemployment especially for young people, but also as a means to show
that New Labour “means business” in its own particular way. In this respect Welfare to Work
cannot solely be considered as just another employment creating scheme but the opportunity
for the Labour Party to show that it does have new and different policies to offer. With the
General Elections not that far away, although employment creation may not be a major issue,
the way in which New Labour deals with the unemployed may prove to be decisive.
Welfare to Work should not be reduced to job creation but considered within a larger
remit for in many respects it is the true mirror of the values that New Labour is attempting to
stand for.  In the words of MP David Willett: “Welfare to work is not an issue just for the
unemployed, its success is central to constructing a modern progressive project for the new
government” [Willetts, 1998, p.9].
1 Welfare to Work
Often called the New Deal, New Labour’s employment policy Welfare to Work at first
targeted  the  young  unemployed  before  being  extended  to  all  unemployed  people.  At  the
outset, it was experimented in twelve ‘Pathfinder’ areas for the first four months – January to
April 1998 - before becoming a national plan. 
18-24 year olds who have been out of work for at least six months are channelled via New
Deal advisors into a series of options. This initial evaluation and assessment phase is called
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‘Gateway’  and is  meant  to identify genuine claimants who have a right to services while
steering as many as possible towards “normal” employment. Claimants who remain within the
programme are offered a full time course, subsidised work or a placement in the voluntary
sector whereby for a six month period, they receive benefits plus a fixed sum as a form of
wage. New Labour has been very firm in stating that there is no fifth option, in other words,
claimants who “opt out” can forfeit the right to a part or even all of their benefits.
For the long-term unemployed aged 25 and over who have been out of work for at least
two years, the programme began in June 1998. While participation is mandatory, counselling
is more intensive and the same rules on benefit withdrawal are applied. Employer subsidy for
this category is £75 week whereas for the young new dealers it is £60 week.
The New Deal also encompasses lone parents and the disabled but as yet participation is
voluntary.
1.1 Welfare to work and the reform of welfare
Prior to the 1997 election, the Labour Party published a series of policy statements in the
“Road  to  the  Manifesto”  series.  The  pamphlet  concerning  social  security  starts  thus:
“Labour’s benefit-to work strategy is at the heart of our approach to welfare reform” [Labour
Party, 1996] and attempts at stating Labour’s case for combining job creation strategy and a
more efficient welfare state as if the two were intrinsically linked. During the 1997 conference
when Labour had been in office for five months,  Chancellor Gordon Brown spoke of his
party’s commitment to “re-establishing the work ethic at the centre of our welfare system”
[Times & Guardian 29/09/97]. This could be seen as pertinent examples of how the Labour
Party is quite prepared to borrow from the New Right by suggesting that the unemployed
impose a heavy burden upon an already ailing welfare state: “A welfare-to-work strategy […]
is also the key to sensible reductions in the cost of social security to the country as a whole”
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[Labour  Party  op.  cit.,.  p.1].  Despite  the  fact  that  the  “safety  net”  feature  built  in  to
unemployment benefits has been retained, using welfare to encourage a return to work betrays
to what extent the party has drifted from its traditional attitude towards the welfare state:
“Much of the official discussion around these [welfare to work] measures borrows from
the US ‘welfare to work’ agenda, which is in the process of changing the way the word
‘welfare’ is used in Britain towards meaning cash benefits for the poorest as in the US,
rather than the much wider concept generally used in British debates over the ‘welfare
state’ ”. [Hills, 1998, p.26]
The pamphlet seeks to emphasise the new partnership to be created between the various
employment services and the unemployed so that the latter  will have every opportunity to
reintegrate  the mainstream labour market;  mainstream because although workfare rhetoric
tends to postulate that any job is better than no job at all, New Labour is keen for job seekers
to  find  employment  that  corresponds  to  their  aspirations.2 Notwithstanding,  Labour  has
continued to impose benefit penalties on those who “unreasonably [refuse] a suitable offer”
[Labour Party op. cit.,. p.2] since the “taxpayer after all, has a legitimate interest in ensuring
that no-one is taking the benefit system for a ride” [Ibid.]. This firm attitude has been repeated
on many an occasion by the Prime Minister himself: “It really is the end of the something for
nothing days” [Daily Mail 10/02/1999].
Adopting this unconventional attitude – at least for the Labour Party - towards benefit
recipients has been no easy task for New Labour as the backbench revolt about lone parents
showed in December  1997. Generally speaking welfare reform is  hard to achieve if  only
because of the entrenched interests that have to be dealt with. This is all the more difficult
2 For an interesting discussion about this particular point see Forrest, David,  Low Pay or No Pay, Institute of
Economic Affairs, Hobart paper 101, 1984.
9
should a political party be elected with the intention of replacing the welfare state with a
“welfare society” [Giddens, 1998, p.117] quite simply because the latter entails a far more
optimistic vision of what welfare can achieve than the former. In other words, whereas the
Conservatives pursued a policy of aggressively adapting Beveridge’s original welfare state to
the requirements of modern society by constantly searching to limit costs, New Labour has
had to renew the welfare state in its own particular way. When the Chancellor declared that
New Labour would respect previous public spending targets for at least the first two years of
office, he made it quite clear that his party was no longer prepared to inject vast sums into the
ailing public sector. At the same time he reassured the electorate that Labour would no longer
be the party that would “tax and spend”.3 But contrary to the Conservatives who dogmatically
whittled down public spending to the extent that it became part and parcel of their ideology,
New  Labour  will  be  treading  dangerous  ground  if  it  complacently  continues  in  its
predecessors footsteps. Reducing the tax burden is one thing but should this be associated
with systematically singling out the most disadvantaged groups for special treatment  then
New Labour’s “third way” may seem vacuous.
By plucking the “welfare society” out of thin air on the other hand, third way friendly
jargon such as citizens  and citizenship can become central  to New Labour’s statement of
policy, rather than simply cost:
“The recasting of New Labour’s conception of citizenship and the emphasis placed on
employment may be as important as other shifts in the Party’s welfare policy such as the
relegation  of  equality  as  a  social  democratic  objective  and the  prioritisation  of  social
inclusion as an objective” [King & Wickham-Jones in Powell (ed), 1999, p.278].
3 The question of tax  has  traditionally been a weak point for  the Labour  Party.  The electorate  has  become
accustomed to associating the party’s major reforms with an increase in the tax burden. This has had disastrous
effects  on  election  results  until  1997  when  the  Labour  Party  radically  tightened  up  its  fiscal  policies  by
promising not to exceed targets set by the Conservatives.
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“Dutiless rights” are replaced by “conditional welfare” and in so doing reductions in social
security spending can be portrayed as being a far more optimistic means to an end rather than
the dogmatic pursuit of an overall austere attitude towards the least fortunate. For example
Welfare to Work can be instrumental in creating an “inclusive society”, one in which “active
welfare”  replaces  “passive  benefits”  and where  the  unemployed  are  shown that  they  can
rather than they should work. By underlining this last potential virtue of the New Deal, New
Labour opens broader horizons for the unemployed.  Not only does employment  exist  and
therefore does not need to be created but rather provoked, but the unemployed are also invited
to become stakeholders in a permanent partnership with the State and therefore responsible
for  the part  that  they chose  to  play in  society.  Work therefore  becomes  a mechanism of
inclusion just as education and services were according to the more “traditional” socialists.
2 Carrot or stick?
The conservative heritage was one of austerity and rather than inviting the least well-off to
acknowledge the potential  they had to improve their  lot,  they were forced into becoming
entirely responsible for their own personal situation. This is often rather blithely referred to as
a return to “Victorian values” despite the fact that the modern labour market has very little in
common with this period of British history. 
If New Labour’s approach is supposed to represent a break both with the New Right and
the Old Left then unemployment is an ideal training ground on which to experiment its own
particular brand of radicalism. Before taking office, and in order to reinforce Labour’s post-
ideological stance, Tony Blair stated that his party’s radicalism “will not be that of doctrine,
whether left or right, but of achievement. New Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not of
outdated ideology”. This was supplemented by an appeal for pragmatic politics in rhetoric
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that  is  very reminiscent  of  Mrs  Thatcher’s  ability  to  coin  phrases:  “What  counts  is  what
works”  [Blair,  1997].  Nonetheless,  drawing  the  line  between  ideological  and  pragmatic
success is a precarious task and it is where the two merge that New Labour can so easily
overstep the political boundary that is supposed to separate it from its opponents and above all
its predecessors.
New Labour has indeed been criticised for the apparent ease with which it has integrated
neo-liberal policies and the smattering of more social measures tagged on to the “third way” is
not convincing: 
“The more recent appropriation of ‘third way’ by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair has met
with a lukewarm reception from most Continental social democrats, as well as from old
left  critics  in  their  respective  countries.  The critics  see the third way in this  guise as
warmed-over  neoliberalism.  […] On coming to power,  his  critics  say,  Blair  and New
Labour have persisted with the economic policies of Margaret Thatcher” [Giddens  op.
cit., p.25].
The treatment of the unemployed is a case in point since New Labour inherited a situation
whereby its predecessors tended to unload the responsibility of finding work onto the jobless
themselves. This “workfarist” model of the labour market imported from America, involved
punitive action against the unemployed so that they would be forced into accepting available
jobs.  By withdrawing benefits,  as is  the case for Jobs Seekers  Allowance (JSA) – which
incidentally has been maintained by New Labour - should the claimant fail to accept work,
government could legitimately state that it was endeavouring to eradicate idleness which, in
terms of popular imagery is an efficient vote catcher. The myth that the unemployed just do
not want to work is still very valid and thus justifies in many ways the political necessity to
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maintain a distinction between the undeserving and deserving recipients of unemployment
benefits. This again has drawn rather far fetched comparisons with the Victorian era when it
was thought fit to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving poor.
Given the labour market situation in Great Britain, this argument holds water. Headline
statistics  so  often  quoted  by  foreign  politicians  for  whom the  British  labour  market  has
become a paradigm, all too often portray a situation almost pertaining to full employment.
What foreign admirers overlook is the fact that the type of “workfare” employment readily
available – if the American experience is anything to go by - is “predominately found in low-
paid, insecure forms of employment in the peripheral labour market” [Michel, Agnès, 1999
p.13]. This tends to underline the fact that employment encompassed by workfare policies
exists primarily because it is shed by the mainstream labour market. It does not come within
the  scope  of  organised  labour  and  is  therefore  handed  down  to  the  worst-off  and  most
vulnerable.
In this respect that non acceptance of workfare employment should be accompanied by
sanctions comes as no surprise. Given the quality of work on offer, coercive action is required
if workfare positions are to be filled and above all held down by claimants. This is also a
perfect  example  of  how  labour  market  flexibility  dominates  social  policy  towards  the
unemployed:  rather  than  alleviating  their  relative  poverty  by  using  benefits,  pressure  is
applied  so  that  their  wage  expectations  fall  thus  allowing  them to  reintegrate  the  labour
market.
It would be rather short-sighted even so to suggest that Welfare to Work were nothing
more than elaborate “trainingfare” - as embodied by the Job Seeker’s Allowance - and that
punishing the unemployed was the key issue. Although major similarities with conservative
labour market policies can be underlined the New Deal also draws on other experiences for
example  the  French  Revenu  Minimum  d’Insertion (RMI).  On  a  one-to-one  basis  with  a
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counsellor, RMI claimants assess their specific needs in order to find work. Welfare to Work
goes even further in this direction by costly investment in counselling, especially in the first
phase, which is then followed by a variety of options including training and basic education.
Whereas  workfare  enthusiasts  would  affirm  that  the  essential  requirement  is  to  get  the
unemployed  back  to  work  or  at  least  available  for  work,  “new  dealers”  are  given  the
opportunity to prepare themselves for specific employment [cf. supra].
Despite  this  more  optimistic  approach,  the  programme  contains  a  definite  degree  of
compulsion in that participants cannot opt out and return to benefits. If they do, a part of their
JSA entitlement  can be docked by the social  services.  As yet,  and despite  the myriad  of
statistical information available, it is unclear whether recourse to the “stick” is common.
Compulsory  participation  in  the  scheme  does  not  only  concern  the  activation  of  the
unemployed. It also exerts downward pressure on wage demands for those concerned and in
this respect one of its secondary effects is to contribute to the low wage economy for which
Great Britain is constantly criticised especially by its European partners. This is particularly
important for participants who can claim a reservation wage in excess of what their New Deal
“benefit-plus” or conversion wage might be. In other words, new dealers who have already
worked in the mainstream labour market can identify the sort of wage they think their labour
is worth whereas newcomers are more likely to be ignorant of this. The burden of adjusting to
low or lower wages is brought to bear on participants just as the responsibility for finding
work, during the conservative governments, was transferred from the state to the unemployed.
This  aspect  could  be  justified  by New Labour’s  desire  to  make  rights  conditional  on
responsibilities or to provide benefits which correspond to a  “hand up and not a hand out”.
Whereas before, the unemployed were responsible for their job search, Welfare to Work is
meant to coax them back into employment so that they acknowledge their aptitude to work
and therefore have the responsibility to retain any employment offered.
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There can be no denying that this approach is ostensibly workfarist insofar as the outcome
is to encourage labour force participation by the acceptance of low-paid work. But the New
Deal goes beyond this as we have seen on the one hand by massive investment in counselling
and training facilities. On the other hand, low paid work has been made more acceptable by
the introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) – a form of state organised
wage subsidy -  and since April 1999, the national minimum wage.4 Both of these measures
aim at “making work pay”, one of New Labour’s much brokered catch phrases. WFTC entails
direct state intervention on levels of income,  especially for families as the name suggests
whereas the minimum wage is an important tool in defining exactly which sort of wage floor
Parliament deems is acceptable for the labour market. The level at which the minimum wage
is set is a very high profile benchmark by which government support for a low wage economy
can be measured especially in the case of the Welfare to Work scheme since employment can
stem from state intervention.
Rather  than  being  a  job  creation  mechanism  therefore,  Welfare  to  Work  “involves
extending  the  range  of  jobs  which  the  unemployed  can  be  required  to  accept”  whilst
“imposing  greater  intensity  and monitoring  of  their  [job]  search”  [Gray,  1998,  p.12].  By
combining  Welfare  to  Work  with  WFTC,  the  minimum  wage  and  improved  child  care
facilities, government is showing its desire to concentrate both on participants being available
and actively seeking work. In terms of social policy, the scheme is “focused on increasing the
flexibility of wage expectations and the willingness of the unemployed to take a job at low
wages, rather than on alleviating poverty or on providing job opportunities at prevailing
wage rates” [Gray  ibid. emphasis added]. In light of this, even if Welfare to Work can be
considered as a drift towards American style workfare, it does stop short of an all out punitive
4 For further details concerning the introduction of the national minimum wage in Great Britain see Whitton,
Timothy,  “Labour’s National Minimum Wage”,  in,  Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique,  vol 9, n°3,
1997, pp. 115-127. Details concerning WFTC can be found in this publication or in Whitton Timothy, “Welfare
to Work: politique progressiste  ou miroir  aux alouettes?”,  in,  New Labour:  rupture ou continuité?,  Presses
Universitaires de Rennes, à paraître en septembre 2000.
15
onslaught  on the  unemployed.  While  the  built  in  training  and educational  facilities  force
comparisons  with  continental  policies  the  concept  of  employability  has  far  reaching
implications.
3 Employability
New Labour came to power promising  a break both with the  eighteen  years  of  Tory
policies  and the ideas  of  “Old” Labour.  As far as the labour  market  is  concerned labour
leaders were particularly struck by the number of households in which unemployment had
become endemic. Although the poverty experienced by people in these family units was and
still  is a major preoccupation,  it  was the lack of work culture,  as described by American
economists Murray and Mead on which they focussed their attention. As true neo-liberals,
Murray  and  Mead  spoke  of  an  “underclass”  that  was  unemployable  to  the  extent  that
government should have no qualms about using compulsion to force them into the labour
market.
But this  pessimistic  vision does not tally with New Labour’s desire to promote social
democratic citizenship using the idea that rights must be balanced by responsibilities. Even so,
by committing itself to compulsion and coercion albeit in a “third way”, New Labour has
turned its back on former Labour policies designed to reduce unemployment.  In 1987 the
National Executive Council declared that “…people should join the [employment]  scheme
because they want to, not because they fear they will lose all or part of their benefits if they
don’t.  Compulsion  is  a  recipe  for  lower standards,  resentment  and discrimination”  [NEC,
1988, p1].
Perhaps one of the main justifications that New Labour can find to this u-turn is the notion
of employability. When Tony Blair first expressed his ideas on the subject, employability was
assumed to be some form of flexibility which has been integrated into continental  labour
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market rhetoric. In France, flexibility is a double edged knife: on the one hand it can involve
worker friendly labour policies in accordance with union negotiated terms covering family
needs  or  improved  leisure  activities  while  being  inductive  to  job  creation  through  work
sharing  schemes  for  example.  On  another  level,  flexibility  can  be  taken  to  mean  that
employees’ welfare becomes totally subordinate to the market and that their availability to
provide labour depends entirely on the ebb and flow of business. In this case employability
implies that the workforce should be in a position to offer their labour should it be required.
In the 1980’s, training fare schemes such as Youth Training Scheme (YTS) came across
as being some sort of labour therapy that the young unemployed needed in order to revive
their work culture. Basic requirements such as punctuality, politeness, standards of dressing
and appearance  were  emphasised  as  being  central  to  jobsearch  rather  than  specific  skills
which could be acquired once the claimant’s primary needs had been met. Welfare to Work
functions in much the same way except that the unemployed are not considered unemployable
or that they belong to an underclass of some description but that they are underactive. This
corresponds to OECD directives whereby the strength of a country’s labour force is measured
not by the number of people employed, but by the number of people who are active and ready
to stake a claim in society initially through their contribution to the labour market which then
determines  the  way they can  strive  to  obtain  a  part  of  the  nation’s  wealth.  This  is  very
reminiscent once again of Beveridge who in 1942 took great pains to say that the state had a
duty to provide minimums for everybody – especially during times of hardship – so that they
could be allowed to improve their lot. With the passing of time, this has become known as
universalism – the “bête noire” of liberal economists - erroneously so since Beveridge never
meant benefits to become a permanent feature of the social landscape. In his opinion they
were, just as Welfare to Work is, a way forwards to a “better” society and in this respect the
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New Deal is not such a radical move away from the Labour Party’s fundamental objectives as
might be expected given New Labour’s repudiation of old values and outdated ideology.
Given, therefore, that government’s aim is to create an active society,  responsibility to
meet the demand for labour falls upon government itself. This can be considered in two ways:
i) if employment exists, then it is government’s task to create a match between the labour
force and the demands of the market; ii) if labour supply dos not match demand then it is
government’s task to correct the unbalance by, for example, providing the educational and
training  facilities  that  will  allow  labour  to  adjust.  In  Scandinavian  countries  where
government has traditionally been highly involved in equating labour supply with demand,
thanks mainly to intense collaboration with trade unions, the emphasis is on high technology
and training. The essential difference between this type of labour market and what can be
found in Great Britain is that employment schemes do not necessarily target entrance on the
labour  market  at  the  lowest  level,  in  other  words  at  the  point  where  low-paid  unskilled
workers tend to cluster. On the contrary, programmes are designed to provide labour where it
is needed and in doing so participants can command decent union negotiated wages thanks to
the skills that they acquire. Employability in this case is not reduced to its minimal definition
of reviving work culture but involves positive adjustment in respect of demand. The overall
outcome is that quality becomes as important as quantity one aspect that Welfare to Work has
failed to fully integrate.
Because of New Labour’s commitment to promoting a work culture that combines rights
and  responsibilities,  the  element  of  compulsion  built  in  to  Welfare  to  Work  cannot  be
neglected and if taken at face value can have far reaching long term consequences. Insofar as
unemployment figures are falling fast to the extent that full employment is now a legitimate
claim albeit saturated with electoral connotations, government can promote the idea that the
unemployed are unemployable. New Labour has done this by accepting to activate those who
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cannot fend for themselves on the labour market and in so doing has integrated the concept
whereby government  still  has  a  responsibility  to  care  for  the  worst-off.5 But  even if  this
approach can be considered as a break with the austerity of the Conservatives,  improving
employability does not guarantee job creation. Activating the unemployed is one thing but
actually  providing  or  creating  jobs  is  another  and  government’s  leniency  in  imposing
sanctions  will  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  it  is  prepared  to  believe  that  a  person’s
unemployment is due to personal failings. In simple terms sanctions would be superfluous if it
was thought that claimants were doing their utmost to find work.
Therefore  should  the  promotion  of  employability  be  seen  as  government’s  main
employment policy, there is no telling to what extent compulsion will become instrumental in
reducing unemployment figures particularly during a pre-electoral period. Welfare to Work
could thus become an extremely efficient machine for identifying and further stigmatising the
unemployed rather than a comprehensive set of policies designed to renew their work culture.
With the introduction of the “permanent deal” not only will the young unemployed bear the
full brunt of New Labour’s employment stick but all those claming benefits. In the words of
The Times, commenting on the 1999 Labour conference: “[The ‘Permanent Deal’] will oblige
every unemployed person to work, receive training or re-enter formal education,  or risk a
substantial  cut  in benefits.  This  is  a  radical,  welcome,  initiative  that  would move Britain
towards the workfare approach pioneered in America”.
4 What counts is what works
In  a  recent  speech  to  the  Institute  of  Public  Policy  Research  [June  7,  2000],  David
Blunkett  declared:  “Through  this  programme  [the  New  Deal],  we  have  already  placed
210,000 young people in work –  most of them quicker than they would otherwise have
5 
“Activating”  the large  reserve  of  unemployable  or  inactive  welfare  claimants  has  been  popular  in  France
recently during  negotiations  between  the  government  and  the  MEDEF.  Workfare  is  discretely  crossing  the
channel!
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found work (emphasis added)”. By providing this assessment, the Minister for Employment
underlines the ambiguities inherent to any sort of evaluation that attempts at weighing up the
successes and failures of Welfare to Work.
To prove the viability of Welfare to Work, it would be very convenient indeed to be able
to  provide  precise  information  concerning  the  number  of  jobs  that  the  programme  has
provided. But the truth is that it was never really designed to be a job creation mechanism
even though some employment inevitably flows from all forms of jobsearch. On the contrary,
Welfare to Work aims essentially at improving employability and therefore jobseekers’ ability
to obtain work that already exists. Monitoring the degree of programme success is therefore
extremely difficult if only because of the “deadweight” involved, that is to say the amount of
Welfare to Work funding absorbed by candidates who only needed a minimal amount of help
to (re)integrate the labour market. Broadly speaking, there is a deadweight loss of some 50%
which is very similar to other labour market programmes if churning is not taken into account
in other words claimants who go round the cycle once and then reintegrate the system if only
to avoid losing out on benefits [Anderton et al, 1999, p.14].
Added to this is that fact that should candidates only require a slight push in the right
direction,  the  overlap  between Welfare  to  Work and the  Employment  Services’  scope of
action can legitimately be questioned. Normally, it is the Job Centres’ responsibility to steer
claimants towards vacancies but Welfare to Work gradually seems to be encroaching on this
remit.  As time goes by and the “better” new dealers go through the system, they will  be
replaced  by  the  more  -  even  the  most  -  unemployable  claimants  who  will  test  the
programme’s efficiency to the full.
To what then does the Minister’s evaluation correspond? From the very beginning of the
New Deal, government pledged to provide full statistics to monitor programme efficiency.
Figures are published on a monthly basis in the Labour Market Trends publication and map
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out numbers of claimants entering and leaving the system, options chosen and to a certain
extent  provide  basic  information  on the  origin  and identity  of  young  new dealers  (male,
female, people with disabilities, people from ethnic minority groups, white and “prefer not to
say”).  Information  is  also  provided  about  the  stage  at  which  these  participants  leave  the
programme either to go into employment or not. Separate statistics are provided for the over
25 new dealers. Many of the headline statistics underline the cost of the programme – and
therefore the cost of jobs created - pointing out that the windfall tax does not represent an
unlimited supply of funding.6 Government replies by saying in typical beveridgian style that
in  time  the  programme  will  pay  for  itself  through  growth  obtained  by  an  increase  in
employment adding that Welfare to Work should be considered as a temporary scheme to
enhance a new work culture which will in time dispense with the need for major government
intervention in the labour market.7
It must be said that this conviction is backed up by official New Deal statistics insofar as
figures for claimants who leave the programme to take up unsubsidised jobs are far in excess
of  subsidised  work  [Employment  Service  statistics  1998,1999,2000].  This  would  tend  to
underline the fact that, as government suggests, the programme will encourage claimants to
“trade  welfare  for  work” [The Sunday Times,  September  19,  1999].  Even so,  The Times
somewhat overturns this optimistic statement thus:“The unemployed are facing the tightest
benefit rules ever devised under a government crackdown on the culture of life on the dole”,
an appraisal which is somewhat softened by the Chancellor further on who states “We have
kept our side of the bargain by providing the opportunities. It is now for young people to look
at  the  one  million  vacancies  and  the  opportunities  that  exist  and  show  they  have  a
responsibility to take them up” [The Times, September 17, 1999]. The Chancellor prefers to
6 Funding for the New Deal was obtained by using a special “windfall” tax on the privatised utilities.
7 Beveridge went to great lengths to point out that “his” welfare state was there should people need it. Popular
imagery  would  have  it  otherwise  and  in  many  respects  what  was  supposed  to  be  a  safety  net  has  been
transformed into welfare rights for all.
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refer  to  new  dealers  as  the  “workshy”  rather  than  the  unemployed  –  or  indeed  the
unemployable – which takes for granted the fact that the unemployed are ready and willing to
work if given the opportunity to do so. 
This said, the Minister’s claim concerns the number of young people who have found
work  since  Labour  took office  in  1997  and  does  not  identify  those  claimants  who  have
directly  gone into employment  thanks to  the programme or  those  who have simply been
“churned” round the whole system. A closer analysis of Welfare to Work [Michel,  op. cit.]
shows that however doubtful the job creation potential may be, it is definitely an extremely
efficient  mechanism  for  compiling  knowledge  about  the  unemployed  and  the  sort  of
behaviour they can have vis à vis employment policies and especially workfare. To this end,
New Deal advisors often underline the total lack of basic skills that many claimants suffer
from along with basic employment aptitudes such as reading, writing, dressing correctly and
speaking coherently.8 If this is the case then at least part of Welfare to Work is being absorbed
by  the  provision  of  basic  education  and  training  facilities  which  are  a  far  cry  from the
headline  qualities  the  programme  is  supposed  to  be  endowed  with.  In  the  words  of  the
Employment Service’s first year New Deal evaluation “It is possible that the high proportion
[of claimants] going into education and training reflects the type of people likely to be on the
claimant count when unemployment is at a twenty year low. They are likely to be the ‘least
employable’ ” [p.10].
The success  of  unsubsidised  work as  compared  to  subsidised  also tends  to  show that
employers are not exploiting the system as much as was expected at the outset [Anderton et
al, 1999, p.9]. Generally speaking it was feared that employers might exercise even greater
prejudice  towards  the  unemployed  who need special  help  in  finding work  by taking  full
advantage of their subsidised labour. The whole point of Welfare to Work is that subsidised
8 One New Deal counsellor mentioned two different claimants, one of whom couldn’t read and the other who
was an Oxford graduate.
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labour  should  be  transformed  into  sustainable  employment  thanks  to  the  improved
employability of participants but there is no denying that in some circumstances displacement
or  substitution  has  occurred.  In  the  former  case,  wage  subsidies  give  new  dealers  a
competitive  advantage  over  other  “normal”  candidates  in  jobsearch  and  in  the  latter,
employers use new dealers to replace other workers.
One way of measuring the impact of the New Deal especially for young workers who
have been affected by it longest, is to compare youth unemployment from 1998 onwards with
estimates of what it  would have been without the New Deal [Employment Service,  1999,
p.8.]. Notwithstanding the pre New Deal trend of falling unemployment generally, a gap of
35000 less unemployed youths can be estimated.9 To say that over the first year Welfare to
Work has reduced unemployment by this figure would be erroneous for it is impossible to
isolate the whole economy from the youth labour market if only,  for example,  because of
substitution.  It  is  also  worth  mentioning  at  this  point  that  any  estimated  reduction  in
unemployment cannot be translated into terms of an equivalent increase in employment but
employment  and  inactivity since not all claimants entering the New Deal flow out towards
employment: training and education options are a case in point especially since they have
been so popular. [New Deal, “Features”, Labour Market Trends]
Lastly,  the effects  of the New Deal can be compared with the introduction of JSA in
October 1996. Rather than increasing employability, JSA was designed primarily to intensify
jobsearch. Sweeny and McMahon [1998] found that outflows from unemployment increased
considerably for all groups of the unemployed following implementation of JSA. This could
mean that Welfare to Work has to cater for the most unemployable who have not been able to
integrate the labour market despite the threat of benefit withdrawal. To this end, despite the
possible displacement and substitution effects, which are mitigated by the act that employers
9 The fall in the the unemployment rate due to the massive transformation of full-time jobs into part-time ones is 
studied in Whitton Timothy “Labour’s National Minimum Wage”, op., cit.
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are more likely to employ the employable, the programme can be considered to be a success
but at a considerably greater cost than was first forecast because of deadweight.
Conclusion
By endorsing workfarist attitudes to employment, the Welfare to Work programme has
driven a decisive wedge not only into the reform of welfare debate but also into government
attitudes towards the unemployed. There can be no denying that the New Deal is a definite
move towards workfare first introduced by the previous conservative governments and in this
way depicts New Labour’s intention to integrate more market inspired “neo-liberal” policies.
Although using benefits to improve employability was not meant to increase employment
especially given the rate of official unemployment in Great Britain, all jobsearch programmes
tend to generate  extra  work.  The danger  that  subsidised workers may be used to  replace
unsubsidised ones seems to be minimal  but  the programme’s  potential  for reducing wage
pressure is  manifest  and as such, seems to unveil  the more sinister  side of government’s
intentions. These effects have been somewhat reduced by New Labour’s attempts at adapting
American style workfare to a policy of making work pay. The national minimum wage, the
Working Family’s tax credit and improved childcare facilities have softened the impact of
government’s  contribution  to  a  low wage  economy  and  have  generally  provided  a  more
optimistic outlook to employment policies. In this way, not only has New Labour broken with
Britain’s immediate political past but also with the party’s traditional stance. 
At the same time it has preserved some of the compassion that the party has traditionally
shown towards the unemployed as well as the conviction that market forces alone cannot be
left to regulate the labour market: government still has a responsibility to help supply and
demand to adjust  to one another.  Success of the education  and training  options  highlight
government’s necessary involvement but if too much time and energy is devoted to meeting
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claimants’ basic needs the programme’s advertised ambitions could be thwarted and in many
ways Welfare to Work may be reduced to providing first-hand information about the needs of
those who find it the most difficult to find work.
By accepting the need to impose sanctions on the hitherto called “workshy”, New Labour
has shown that employment policies are no longer one-way: claimants can expect government
to give them a “hand up” but no longer a “handout” and this involves dual responsibility. In
this respect, Welfare to Work goes far beyond its remit of reducing unemployment to become
a mirror image of what New Labour likes to call its “third way”. Rather than drawing too
heavily on American workfare experiences,  New Labour would be well  advised too look
further a field for innovative inspiration. The Scandinavian labour markets could provide a
satisfactory starting point.
The success of the New Deal will depend on its life span. Should it disappear naturally
then it will have succeeded, albeit at great cost, in reviving the sort of work culture that the
lower levels of the British labour market has lost. If on the other hand the New Deal becomes
a  permanent  feature  of  the  welfare  state  then  not  only  will  government  perpetuate  its
contribution  to  the  low  wage  economy  synonymous  of  poor  quality  employment,  but
“employability” will become just one more myth to be found at the end of the third way’s
political rainbow.
Bibliography
Anderton, Bob, Riley Rebecca & Young Garry, December 1999,  The New Deal for Young
People: First Year Analysis of Implications for the Macroeconomy, Employment Service,
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, ESR33.
Beveridge, William, 1942, The Beveridge Report, London, HMSO.
Blair, Tony, 24/01/97, The 21st Century Welfare State, Speech in Amsterdam, London, Labour
Party.
Blunkett, David, June 7, 2000,  Transforming the Welfare State: “On Your Side”, The New
Welfare  State as the Engine of  Economic Prosperity,  Speech to the Institute  of Public
Policy Research, (http://www.dfee.gov.uk/Dbspeech070600/index.htm).
25
Department of Social Security, 1997, A New Contract for Welfare : New Ambitions for our
Country, Cm 3805, London, The Stationary Office.
Dixon, Keith, 2000, Un digne héritier, Paris, Raisons d’Agir.
Employment Service, statistics 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, Labour Market Trends.
Dryson Jane & Penman Alison, 11/02/98 & 98/60, 13/05/98,  The Government’s Welfare to
Work Proposals, House of Commons research papers 98/23.
Field,  Frank,  1995,  Making  Welfare  Work:  Reconstructing  Welfare  for  the  Millennium,
London, Institute of Community Studies.
Giddens, Anthony, 1998, The Third Way: the Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press.
Gray,  Anne,  1998,  The  New  Deal  and  Welfare  Reform:  Opportunity,  Punishment  or
Deterrence?, School of Urban Policy and Development, South Bank University.
Guardian, Sunday Times & Times 1997,1998,1999 CDROM.
Halpern, D., & Mikosz, D., (eds), 1998,  The Third Way: Summary of the Nexus On-Line
Discussion, London: Nexus.
Hills,  John,  1998,  Thatcherism,  New  Labour  and  the  Welfare  State,  London,  Centre  for
Analysis of Social Exclusion.
Jarvis, Timothy, 1997, Welfare to Work: the New Deal, House of Commons Research Paper
97/118.
Jordan, W, 1998, The New Politics of Welfare. Social Justice in a Global Context, London,
Sage Publications.
King, Desmond, 1995,  Actively Seeking Work? The Politics of Unemployment and Welfare
Policy in the United States and Great Britain, Chicago and London, University of Chicago
Press.
Labour Party, 1997, Road to the Manifesto, Getting Welfare to Work: A New Vision for Social
Security, London, Labour Party.
Labour Party, 1998, Charter Against Workfare.
Mead, Laurence, 1997,  From Welfare to Work, Lessons from America, London, Institute of
Economic Affairs Health and Welfare Unit.
Michel, Agnes, 1999, A New Deal for the Young Unemployed – Sound Bite or Sound Policy?,
University of Hertfordshire Business School: Employment Studies paper 29.
Millar,  Webb  & Kemp,  1997,  Combining  Work  and  Welfare,  London,  Joseph  Rowntree
Foundation.
New  Deal,  1998,  1999,  2000,  Features,  Research  Briefs,  Technical  Reports,  Research
Reports, Employment Service, Labour Market Trends.
New Deal website, http://www.dfee.gov.uk
Nye, Roderick, 1996, Welfare to Work: the America Works Experience, London, The Social
Market Foundation.
Powell  Martin  (ed.),  1999,  New Labour,  New Welfare  State? The ‘Third Way’  in  British
Social Policy, University of Bristol, the Policy Press.
Sweeney,  K.,  &  McMahon,  D.,  “The  Effect  of  Jobseeker’s  Allowance  on  the  Claimant
Count”, Labour Market Trends, 106(4), 195-202.
Willetts, David, 1998, Welfare to Work, London, The Social Market Foundation.
26
27
